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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-DUE PROCESS-
CIVIL COMMITMENT- MENTALLY ILL AND RETARDED JUVENILES-The
United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of Penn-
sylvania's voluntary admission and commitment procedures for men-
tally ill or retarded juveniles, which provide for determination by a
neutral fact finder of the necessity for confinement and periodic review
of the necessity for continued confinement by a similar procedure.
Secretary of Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640
(1979).
In 1975, a group of juvenile plaintiffs brought a class action in
federal district court' in which they challenged the constitutionality of
the procedures employed by Pennsylvania when admitting or commit-
ting juveniles on a voluntary basis to state mental hospitals. The class
alleged that they had been deprived of personal liberty without the
procedural safeguards required by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment? The three-judge district court decided, in Bartley
v. Kremens,4 that Pennsylvania's procedures for voluntary commitment
of juveniles violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' The United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated the
1. Federal jurisdiction was based upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) (1976). Bartley v.
Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 104142 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119
(1976), original judgment reinstated sub nom. Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of
Pub. Welfare, 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 442 U.S. 640 (1979).
2. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. at 1041. Plaintiffs were juveniles suing on
behalf of all named plaintiffs and all persons eighteen years of age or younger who had
been, were, or were to be admitted or committed to state mental health institutions under
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
3. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. at 1042. Section 4402 provides that parents,
guardians, or persons standing in loco parentis could apply for the voluntary admission of
persons eighteen years of age or younger for examination, treatment, and care. The
statute had no provisions for notice, hearings, representation by counsel, or the presenta-
tion of evidence on the juvenile's behalf. A juvenile could not call his own witnesses or
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. There was also no provision for
contesting detention. If the person admitted was younger than eighteen, only the appli-
cant or his successor could apply to withdraw the juvenile. Id. Section 4403 provides for
the director of the mental health facility to "cause an examination to be made" and, if
determined that care or observation was necessary, a thirty-day renewable commitment
was permissible. If older than eighteen, the person could not be detained for more than
ten days after giving written notice of objection to detention. Both sections provided that
notice of the voluntary status of the commitment be given to the juvenile every sixty
days.
4. 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
5. Id. at 1053-54. The district court concluded that Pennsylvania's statute did not
protect a child's liberty interest because there was no probable cause hearing on the
necessity for continued detention after the initial admission. Id. at 1049.
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decision' and remanded the case for rehearing because the claims of
some of the plaintiffs had been mooted by the promulgation of supple-
mentary regulations by Pennsylvania's Secretary of Public Welfare
In Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Public Welfare,' the
principal case on remand, the district court approved two subclasses of
plaintiffs9 and again declared that Pennsylvania's voluntary admission
and commitment procedures were unconstitutional and enjoined their
enforcement. 0 In doing so, the court reiterated the guidelines it had
6. 431 U.S. 119 (1977). The Court instructed the district court to carefully examine
the differences between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded when reconsidering
the class certification issue. Id. at 134-35. On remand, the district court concluded that
there was little difference between the two groups in terms of the process due in commit-
ment situations. 459 F. Supp. at 39. The district court reasoned that both groups are in a
similar position with respect to stigmatization by society, diagnostic error, parent-child
conflicts of interests, and deprivation of personal liberty. Id. at 39-40.
7. 431 U.S. at 127-28, 137. By the time the district court decided the class certifica-
tion issue, the supplementary regulations had become effective. These regulations granted
certain additional procedural rights to retarded children over thirteen years of age. See 3
Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973). After the Supreme Court had noted probable jurisdiction in Bartley
v. Kremens, Pennsylvania enacted the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503 (Purdon Supp. 1979). This Act repealed the 1966 Act as it
applied to mentally ill children over fourteen years of age and permitted them to admit
themselves for treatment. Withdrawal could be accomplished by giving written notice.
Under the 1976 Act and the 1973 regulations, older juveniles Could object-to their commit-
ment. This required the institution's director to initiate involuntary commitment proceed-
ings if he thought continued confinement was necessary. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §
7206 (Purdon Supp. 1979); 3 Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973). Mentally ill children younger than four-
teen remained subject to parental commitment under the 1966 Act but were not subject
to its supplemental regulations. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7502 (Purdon Supp. 1979);
431 U.S. at 130-31. The Supreme Court held that the 1973 regulations and the 1976 Act
had fragmented the class certified by the district court because some of the plaintiffs'
claims were "satisfied in many respects." Id. at 130. Because some of the named plaintiffs
were able to secure a hearing and possibly release without relying on a third party's re-
quest for withdrawal, the Court held that these plaintiffs' claims were moot and directed
the district court to reconsider the class definition and substitute live claims. Id at 134-35.
8. 459 F. Supp. 30 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
9. Id. at 40-43. The court certified a class composed of all mentally ill children under
fourteen years of age, and a class of all mentally retarded juveniles eighteen years of age
or younger.
10. Id. at 47. The court, specifically declared that the 1966 Act, the supplementary
regulations issued in 1973, and the 1976 Act were unconstitutional. In the opinion of the
district court, the 1966 Act violated due process because the referring medical person
need not have specialized in the mental health area. Id at 46 n.57. See also 3 Pa. Bull.
1840 (1973). The statutory role of the facility director may give rise to a conflict with the
child's liberty interest and thus interfere with the child's release. The court reasoned that
the 1973 regulations were inadequate since the written notice provision did little to aid a
child who could neither read nor understand the specified rights. Even if a child did
understand, it would be unrealistic to expect him to shoulder the burden of contacting
counsel. 459 F. Supp. at 45-46. The court held the 1976 Act to be violative of the due pro-
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established in Bartley v. Kremens, which included the necessity of
post-commitment hearings with the benefit of counsel.1' The Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction," consolidated the case with Parham
v. J.R.'3 for oral argument, and again reversed the district court's deci-
sion.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted that the
district court in Institutionalized Juveniles had concluded that the
class members had a constitutionally protected liberty interest that
could not be waived by their parents. 4 This conclusion, when coupled
with the perceived fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, had led the lower
court to hold that only a formal adversary hearing could adequately
protect the class members from needless confinement in mental hospi-
tals.15 The Chief Justice pointed out that the liberty rights and inter-
ests of the children were the same as the interests and obligations of
both the parents and the state.'6 The issue, therefore, was not one of
parental waiver of the child's rights, but whether Pennsylvania's statu-
tory scheme provided juveniles with sufficient due process protections
against unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty."
The majority repeated its conclusion from Parham v. J.R.'8 that it is
the risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have the child in-
cess clause because the Act did not provide for a post-commitment hearing within a
reasonable time nor did it provide for neutral counsel to represent the child's interests.
Id. at 47. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4402, 4403, 7201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979); 3 Pa.
Bull. 1840 (1973).
11. 459 F. Supp. at 43-44. See also 402 F. Supp. at 1043-47. Because the potential for
long-term institutionalization and erroneous diagnosis is high, the district court in Bartley
v. Kremens required certain procedures before juveniles could be institutionalized indefi-
nitely. These procedures included a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours from
the date of initial detention; a post-commitment hearing within two weeks of the date of
initial detention; written notice of the hearing date and of the grounds for the proposed
commitment forty-eight hours prior to any hearing; the presence of counsel and, if indi-
gent, the right to appointment of free counsel, as well as the right to be present at all
hearings and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The juveniles were also given the
right to offer evidence and witnesses in their own behalf. At the conclusion of these pro-
cedures, the juvenile could be institutionalized if the need to do so had been demonstrated
by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1053.
12. 437 U.S. 902 (1979).
13. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). Parham involved a class action suit challenging Georgia's
statutory juvenile commitment procedures on due process grounds.
14. 442 U.S. at 645. In evaluating Pennsylvania's juvenile commitment procedures,
the Court relied on the rationale it had employed in Parham. IM
15. Id. See note 11 supra.
16. The Chief Justice declared that "[tihe liberty rights and interests of the appellee
children, the prerogatives, responsibilities and interests of the parents and the obligations
and interests of the state are the same." 442 U.S. at 646.
17. Id.
18. 442 U.S. at 607.
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stitutionalized which mandates some inquiry to ensure that the statu-
tory requirements for admission are met.'9 Thus, Parham requires a
neutral fact finder to inquire into the child's background using all
available sources, including an interview with the child. This review
must be conducted by a fact finder vested with the authority to refuse
admission to any child who does not meet the medical standards for ad-
mission. Finally, Parham requires a periodic review to determine if
continued confinement is necessary."0
After establishing that Parham controlled the issue of what pro-
cedures were required for the voluntary commitment of children, the
Chief Justice stated that the only remaining issue was whether Penn-
sylvania's procedures complied with these requirements." He first ex-
amined the statutes, regulations, and procedures for the voluntary
admission of mentally ill children. Under the Pennsylvania scheme, a
parent or guardian can initiate the commitment process by applying
for the voluntary examination and treatment of the child." The
hospital treatment team is then required to determine within seventy-
two hours whether inpatient treatment is necessary. Should the
hospital director decide that institutional treatment is necessary, he
must then inform the child and the parents of the decision, and must
also inform them of the nature of the proposed treatment." Once com-
mitted, the child must be reexamined and his treatment plan reviewed
at least once every thirty days.' A child can object to the detention,
and when he does, the plan is reviewed by a professional who is in-
dependent of the treatment team. 5 The findings of this independent
19. 442 U.S. at 646. The Pennsylvania statute provides for admission if a child is "in
need of care or observation" or if he is "mentally ill." See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4102,
4403, 7102 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979) (§ 4102 defines "mental disability"). Before the
decision in Institutionalized Juveniles was handed down, Pennsylvania enacted regula-
tions supplementing the commitment procedures applicable to mentally ill juveniles.
These regulations were enacted pursuant to § 7112 of the 1976 Act. See 8 Pa. Bull.
2433-34 (1978) (§ 7100.101).
20. 442 U.S. at 607.
21. 442 U.S. at 646.
22. Id. at 647. Mentally retarded children eighteen years of age and younger and
mentally ill children under fourteen years of age can be committed by parents or guar-
dians. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403, 7201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979).
23. The 1976 Act provides for notice to the child of the nature of his treatment plan;
and provides for notice to be given parents when a facility accepts a mentally ill minor
aged fourteen to eighteen. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7204, 7205 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
24. 442 U.S. at 647. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403(b), 4404(d), 7108(a) (Purdon
1969 & Supp. 1979); 8 Pa. Bull. 2436 (1978) (§ 7100.108(a)).
25. 442 U.S. at 647. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7108(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979).
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.party are reported to the hospital director who must release a child
not in need of institutional treatment.26
The Chief Justice then examined the procedures regulating the
voluntary admission for institutional care of the mentally retarded. He
found that, unlike the procedures for the mentally ill, a hospital cannot
admit a mentally retarded child based solely on the application of a
parent or guardian. Instead, all mentally retarded children must be
referred by a physician.' The director of the institution must then
make, or cause to be made, an independent evaluation of the child, and
if the director disagrees with the referring physician's recommenda-
tion, the child must be discharged. 28 The majority noted that if a child
over thirteen objects to being institutionalized, the director of the
hospital is required to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings in
which the director bears the burden of proving that inpatient treat-
ment is necessary. 9
The single aspect of the commitment process that was unclear, ac-
cording to the majority, is how the hospital staff decides that institu-
tionalization is required." The only certain evidence on this point
26. 442 U.S. at 647. There are three additional methods for release of mentally ill
juveniles younger than fourteen years of age. First, the parents or guardians may effect
release. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7206(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Sections 4402(c) and 4403(c)
of the 1966 Act are the sections pertaining to parental release of mentally retarded and
younger mentally ill children. Id. §§ 4402(c), 4403(c) (Purdon 1969). Second, "any responsi-
ble party" may petition for the child's release. If a petition for release is filed, an attorney
is appointed to represent the child's interests and a hearing is held within ten days to
determine if continued inpatient treatment is in the child's best interests. This method of
release is apparently available only to mentally ill children as there is no comparable pro-
vision for retarded children. See id. § 7206(b) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Finally, the director of
the facility may release the child when inpatient treatment is no longer necessary. Id.
§ 7206(c).
27. 442 U.S. at 648. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404(b) (Purdon 1969); 3 Pa. Bull.
1840 (1973). Section 4404(b) requires that the physician's reference be accompanied by a
psychologist's report. The 1973 regulations require referral by a psychiatric evaluation.
The referring physician, however, may be either a pediatrician, general practitioner,
psychiatrist or psychologist. 3 Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973).
28. 442 U.S. at 648. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403(b), 4418 (Purdon 1969); 3 Pa.
Bull. 1840 (1973). A mentally retarded child or anyone acting on his behalf may challenge
the legality of the commitment proceedings with a writ of habeas corpus. Habeas corpus
is also available when hospitalization is no longer necessary. The petition for habeas cor-
pus must be accompanied by a physician's affidavit stating either that there is no mental
disability or that institutional treatment is not necessary. 442 U.S. at 648.
29. 442 U.S. at 648. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4426(b)(1), (2) (Purdon 1969); 3 Pa.
Bull. 1840 (1973). For Pennsylvania's involuntary commitment provision see PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 4406 (Purdon 1969).
30. 442 U.S. at 648. Neither the statute nor the regulations specify how the initial
decision is to be made. The only evidence on this point was the testimony of the director
of a state hospital for the mentally ill. Id. at 648-49. See also note 19 supra. The 1973
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showed that the decision was based on the initial examination of the
psychologist. The majority noted that a preadmission background file
on the child was also compiled by the hospital staff. Despite some con-
fusion as to whether these files were actually used in arriving at the
admission decision, the Court assumed that the files had been used.'
The majority concluded that these procedures satisfied the due pro-
cess requirements articulated in Parham in that no child is admitted
without a psychiatric examination undertaken solely to determine if
the child would benefit from institutional care.2 Moreover, the treat-
ment team is not only required to compile a full background of the
child's history from all sources, including an interview with the child
and the parents, but the director must refuse admission if it is not in
the child's best interests." Finally, the majority was satisfied that
periodic review of the child's status was provided for by Pennsylvania's
procedures. 4 Because the procedures satisfied the Parham require-
ments, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 5
Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment of the majority" for the
same reasons he concurred in Parham v. JR.7 In Parham, Justice
Stewart noted that, notwithstanding the massive curtailment of physi-
cal liberty and the stigma attached to institutionalization, it is only
loss of liberty caused by government which invokes the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 Justice Stewart reasoned that
regulations require a psychiatrist's report stating that institutionalization is required. 3
Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973). The 1976 Act provides that if a mentally ill juvenile fourteen years
of age or older "believes that he is in need of treatment," the juvenile can commit himself.
Parents and guardians are deemed to act for juveniles younger than fourteen. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
31. 442 U.S. at 649 n.8. The Court also quoted the testimony of the director of the
state hospital for the mentally ill describing various subjective and objective testing that
was done after the initial admission. Id. at 648-49. The Court did not state how data
gathered after admission could bear on the decision to admit in the first instance.
32. 442 U.S. at 649-50.
33. Id. See notes 26, 28 & 29 and accompanying text supra.
34. 442 U.S. at 649-50. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403(b), (d), 7108(a) (Purdon 1969
& Supp. 1979). Section 4403(b) provides for thirty-day commitments which may be re-
newed by reapplication "so long as care or observation is necessary." Section 4403(d)
speaks specifically of reviewing commitment "at least annually" by a director-appointed
committee. Section 7108(a) provides for examinations and treatment plan review every
thirty days. See also 8 Pa. Bull. 2436 (1978) (§ 7100.108(a)).
35. 442 U.S. at 650. On remand, the district court was given leave to consider claims
that an individual's commitment did not meet the due process standards. The district
court is also able to determine whether Pennsylvania's post-admission procedures are con-
sistent with due process requirements. See note 73 infra.
36. 442 U.S. at 650 (Stewart, J., concurring).
37. Id.
38. 442 U.S. at 623-25.
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since an adult who voluntarily commits himself cannot claim govern-
mental deprivation of liberty, neither can the child on whose behalf the
adult has invoked voluntary commitment procedures.
Justice Stewart further remarked in Parham that there is a long
legal tradition of permitting parents to make decisions on behalf of
their minor children. 9 In his opinion, the Constitution would tolerate
interference with the traditional authority of parents, but such inter-
vention could not be compelled." Therefore, a statute which reasonably
defines the age of majority and which also creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the parent acts in the best interests of the child does
not violate the fourteenth amendment.'
Justice Brennan, speaking for the minority, agreed with the major-
ity that Pennsylvania's preadmission psychiatric interview procedures
satisfied constitutional due process requirements. 2 He dissented, how-
ever, from the majority's refusal to address the adequacy of Pennsyl-
vania's post-admission procedures. 3 Justice Brennan condemned these
procedures as they applied to mentally retarded children thirteen
years of age and younger because there is no provision for representa-
tion by counsel, nor for prompt post-commitment hearings." He
pointed out that mentally retarded children over thirteen years of age
fare little better. Although they must be informed of their right to a
hearing and be furnished with the telephone number of counsel, these
rights are of little practical benefit because the burden of initiating ac-
tion is placed on the child. Older retarded juveniles are often operating
under the same disabilities as are the younger children and cannot
read, write, use the telephone, nor understand the explanation of their
rights.'5 Justice Brennan stated that the recitation of these statutory
39. Id. at 621-22.
40. Id. at 623-25. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state may in-
tervene between parent and child to enforce child labor laws but intervention is subject
to fourteenth amendment limitations).
41. 442 U.S. at 584 (Stewart, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 650-51 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan agreed with the Court for the reasons he set forth in Parham. See 442 U.S. at 625-33
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan reasoned that
parents would be reluctant to seek help for their child if an adversarial precommitment
hearing was required. A precommitment hearing might also delay needed treatment and
would constitute a direct challenge to parental authority, pitting parent against child and
making an eventual return home, more difficult. See Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S.
at 650-53 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Parham, 442 U.S. at
625-39 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. 442 U.S. at 651 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. Id.
45. Id See 3 Pa. Bull. 1840 (1973), which requires a child to be notified of his rights
to use the telephone in order to contact counsel. If the child is unable to read the state-
ment of his rights, hospital personnel must read and explain the rights to the child.
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rights was a hollow ritual under current Pennsylvania procedures." In
his view, there was a danger that the child's silence or inaction would
be seen as a waiver of due process rights. To ensure that this would
not happen, he concluded that Pennsylvania was required to assign
each institutionalized child a representative who would be obliged to
contact the child and ensure that the child's constitutional rights were
being fully protected.'7
Currently, the mentally ill and mentally retarded may be institution-
alized rather easily." Recently, courts have recognized that although
institutionalization is intended to serve a commendable purpose, it also
involves a severe deprivation of liberty." Because of this recognition,
46. 442 U.S. at 651 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There is
no requirement that counsel be contacted for the child who cannot use the telephone.
Therefore, even if a child does object to detention, there is no guarantee that his right to
a hearing will mature.
47. Id. at 651-52 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Bren-
nan pointed out in Parham that post-admission hearings would not delay treatment or
cause family discord because the family had already been disrupted by placing the child in
the hospital. In a post-admission hearing, the doctors and other institution personnel
would be the child's adversaries, thereby avoiding increased friction between parent and
child. 442 U.S. at 635-36. See note 64 and accompanying text infra.
48. Modern statutes tend to a broad definition of mental disability. Compare PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4102 (Purdon 1969) ("mental disability" is defined as a lack of mental
capacity which makes institutional care necessary or advisable) with 1960 Ga. Laws 837
(repealed 1964) (permitted admission for observation and diagnosis without requirirg
evidence of mental illness to be shown) and GA. CODE ANN. § 88-503.1 (1979) (detention for
treatment of individual showing "evidence of mental illness").
Originally, several states adopted the English practice of determining insanity by a
jury proceeding. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1145, 1146-49 (1954). Most early American cases
involved a question of whether or not removal from society was necessary "to prevent
harm." Id. at 1148. The standard for involuntary commitment was that a person be
"dangerous to self or others" or suffering from such a degree of incomplete development
of mind as to be incapable of adjusting to the social environment in a reasonably efficient
and harmonious manner. Teubner v. State, 216 Minn. 533, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944). See also
Ex parte Harcourt, 27 Cal. App. 642, 150 P. 1001 (1915); Crawford v. Brown, 321 Ill. 305,
151 N.E. 911 (1926); Milne Asylum v. Reilly, 156 La. 314, 100 So. 438 (1924). For further
historical review of the standards for civil commitment, see Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. 1078, 1084-86 (E.D. Wis.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473
(1972).
49. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See also In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.
Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. 1964). In
Specht v. Patterson, the Court established that adults have due process rights in involun-
tary commitment proceedings. The Court held that due process requirements are the
same whether the proceedings are civil or whether they carry a criminal connotation. 386
U.S. at 608. In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court rejected the contention that
because the goal of juvenile delinquency proceedings is to rehabilitate, the due process
guarantees given to adults should not apply. Id. at 16. In this context, the Court again
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adults may not be involuntarily committed unless given due process of
law, including an adversarial hearing with representation by counsel."0
In Institutionalized Juveniles, however, the Supreme Court failed to
extend the same due process guarantees to the commitment of
juveniles by their parents. As a result, the Court's opinion fails to
remedy the inadequate due process safeguards afforded juveniles. This
is largely because the Court continues to characterize the parental
commitment of juveniles as voluntary in nature.51 In both Institu-
tionalized Juveniles and Parham the Court's analysis is based on the
premise that children are voluntarily committed to mental hospitals by
their parents." Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Parham,
stated the rationale behind the voluntary concepts: children are in-
capable of deciding to commit themselves and parents act in their chil-
dren's best interests; therefore, parents are constitutionally permitted
to initiate voluntary commitment procedures for their children.5" This
rationale is similar to the adage that a sweater is something a child
wears when his mother is chilly. That is, parents traditionally have
had the right to raise their children because the law presumes that
parents act in the child's best interests. Thus, interference with this
parental right, despite the child's liberty interest, is not warranted
"[slimply because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or
because it involves risks."' The effect, however, is that juveniles are
involuntarily 5 committed because they enjoy no choice in the matter.
pointed out that it makes no difference whether the proceeding is labeled civil or criminal
because the issue is whether or not the child will be deprived of his liberty. Id. at 27, 36.
The irrelevance of labeling a procedure as civil or criminal was also noted in the case of a
mentally retarded child who was confined in an institution for the "feeble-minded." The
court further stated that it was irrelevant to the due process question whether the pro-
ceeding concerned "mental instability" or delinquency. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d
393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of
Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840, 901 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Volun-
teering Children].
50. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See also note 49 supra. An adult cannot
be involuntarily committed using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Instead, the
necessity for commitment must be shown by at least clear and convincing proof. Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). There is thus a striking difference between adult and
juvenile commitment standards, since the juvenile can be committed based on medical
recommendations only. See notes 60, 61, 65 & 73 and accompanying text infra.
51. 442 U.S. at 646.
52. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. at 646-48; Parham, 442 U.S. at 605-06.
53. 442 U.S. at 621-25 (Stewart, J., concurring). See note 16 and accompanying text
supra.
54. 442 U.S. at 602-04. Chief Justice Burger compared the decision to commit with
the decision to hospitalize for an appendectomy. Id. at 603.
55. The term "involuntary" is defined as "without will or power of choice." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 961 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 446 F. Supp.
1980
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Parents make the decision limited only by the subjective judgments of
physicians or mental health personnel. 6
It is inconsistent to view the third-party commitment of juveniles as
voluntary since a third-party attempt to commit an allegedly incompe-
tent adult is deemed involuntary." This is true even though the appli-
cant is presumed to be acting in the interest of the alleged incompe-
tent." Because the commitment of an adult is seen as involuntary and
entails a severe loss of liberty, the adult is entitled to the rigorous pro-
cedural protections deemed required by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment." With both adults and juveniles, the mental
health expert can recommend institutionalization if in the patient's
best interests," yet the adult but not the child is given the right of
1295, 1310, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (1979). See also
Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (commitment is voluntary only if
"knowingly and intelligently consented to by the person to be committed").
56. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4403, 7205 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979); 3 Pa. Bull.
1840 (1973); 8 Pa. Bull. 2435 (1978) (§ 7100.101). See also note 61 and accompanying text
infra.
57. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4401(b), 4404, 4406(a)(1), 7304, 7305 (Purdon 1969 &
Supp. 1979). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967).
58. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4404(a), 7201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979). In Lynch
v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974), the district court held that where state law
requires or permits the appointment of a guardian ad litem for an alleged incompetent,
the constitutional right to counsel will be satisfied only if the guardian ad litem is a licensed
attorney who assumes a truly adversary position. Id. at 389. See generally Vitek v. Jones,
100 S. Ct. 1254 (1980) (due process must be provided before state prisoners can be involun-
tarily committed).
59. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. at 608-09.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 4404(a), 7201 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1979). The Supreme
Court has accepted the state's argument that because the state's goal is to help and
habilitate, the due process safeguards in juvenile commitments ought not be the same as
those required in adult involuntary commitment proceedings. Parham, 442 U.S. at 620-21.
The "help and habilitate" argument has been stripped of validity in adult involuntary com-
mitment proceedings and in juvenile commitment proceedings. Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967); Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, 170, 339 A.2d 764, 772 (1975), ap-
peal dismissed, 424 U.S. 960 (1976) (because the individual's liberty is at stake, the
rehabilitation argument does not justify confinement by a lower standard of due process).
The lower federal courts have rejected a similar state argument in regard to the physical
plants and staffing of mental health institutions, holding that although states are not
obliged to provide treatment facilities, once they assume the responsibility, they must
fulfill it in a constitutional manner. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 446 F.
Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979); Dixon v.
Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). Therefore, merely because the state
has voluntarily undertaken to provide assistance, fourteenth amendment protections of
juveniles committed for mental health care should not be any different from those afforded
any other individuals who are faced with deprivation of their liberty. See also note 49
supra.
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representation and an evidentiary hearing on the necessity of commit-
ment before a final commitment order may issue."'
The need for an evidentiary hearing is particularly acute in commit-
ment procedures, and in the adult context is viewed as an essential
safeguard against unjust or erroneous commitment decisions." In Insti-
tutionalized Juveniles, the Court recognized that there is an inherent
risk of error in the parental decision to commit a child." However, the
61. See notes 49, 50 & 58 supra. In Parham, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis but did not believe that its shortcomings could be
avoided by substituting a judicial hearing for an evaluation by a trained specialist. 442
U.S. at 609. But cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 430-31 (because certainty of psychi-
atric diagnosis is "virtually beyond reach," the standard of proof in adult involuntary com-
mitment proceedings must be greater than a mere preponderance of evidence). See also
Parham, 442 U.S. at 628-29 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (psychi-
atric diagnosis is "fraught with uncertainties" and psychiatrists will err on the side of
medical caution).
For various reasons, the view that psychiatric opinion is unreliable, subjective, fallible,
and variable is being increasingly adopted in judicial and psychiatric circles. See In re Bally,
482 F.2d 648, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (because the standards for commitment differ greatly,
not only the dangerous are committed under modern law); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F.
Supp. at 1092 n.22 (inadequate commitment examinations); In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp.
18, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1957), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262
F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (hospital policy changed overnight and doctors associated with the
hospital were to classify a sociopathic personality as a mental disease whereas, prior to
the policy change, sociopathology was not so classified); Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa. Super. Ct.
at 181, 339 A.2d at 777 ("norm" is what a psychiatrist believes it to be). See also Albers,
Pasewark & Meyer, Involuntary Hospitalization and Psychiatric Testimony: The Falli-
bility of the Doctrine of Immaculate Perception, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 11, 16 (1976) [herein-
after cited as Doctrine of Immaculate Perception]; Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane
Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rosenhan]. In the Rosenhan
study, a graduate student and a psychologist joined other professionals and committed
themselves to various mental hospitals, claiming to suffer symptoms of different mental
illnesses. Once admitted, they ceased displaying any evidence of mental illness and flag-
rantly pursued the objectives of their study. Hospital personnel never noticed the change
in behavior, but patients did. Id. at 381, 384-85.
62. See, e.g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (adults facing involuntary civil
commitment are entitled to due process protections nearly identical to those guaranteed
criminal defendants by the sixth amendment).
63. 442 U.S. at 646. See also Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-07. Psychologists, psychiatrists
and others who work with and treat the mentally ill contend that often it is the parents,
not the disturbed child, who need treatment. The professionals maintain that in some
situations, the parents may even be the cause of the child's illness. See, e.g., J.L. v.
Parham, 412 F. Supp. 112, 136-37 (M.D. Ga. 1976). rev'd and remanded, 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
See generally Volunteering Children supra note 49, at 859-63; Monahan, Empirical
Analyses of Civil Commitment. Critique and Context, 11 L. & Soc'Y REV. 619, 624 (1977).
The experts have also discovered that parents will seek institutionalization of a mentally
ill or mentally retarded child because of their inability to cope with the child's problem.
Cf. Volunteering Children, supra note 49, at 851 (parents may have resorted to voluntary
commitment procedures to sanction a child's counter-cultural life-style).
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Court appears to be more concerned with not deterring parents from
seeking help for their children" than with subjecting a potentially er-
roneous decision to the adversarial process. In an attempt to prevent
the embarrassment of an adversarial probe into family matters, the
Court tasked psychiatrists with the responsibility of ensuring against
parental error. 5 However, the Court's guidelines also require inquiry
into the child's background "using all available sources" to determine
the necessity for commitment before the child can be admitted initially.
Since interviews with the parents and the child are specifically re-
quired, probes into family affairs would appear to be both unavoidable
and necessary in order to comply with the Court's mandate."
If psychiatric inquiry is to be a reasonable substitute for an adver-
sarial hearing in juvenile commitments, a psychiatrist must ask the
same probing questions that an advocate for the child would ask.
64. 442 U.S. at 605. The Court perceived a danger of disrupting family harmony if
adversarial hearings were required, since the child would be pitted against the parent. Id.
at 610. But see note 47 supra. This rationale is being abandoned as a basis for barring
child-parent suits in the tort area due to the realization that the disruption is caused by
the tort itself and that harmony has disappeared by the time legal action is taken. See W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 864-67 (4th ed. 1971). See also Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d
642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REV. 823,
837 (1956). If the parent is willing to give custody of his child to the state, however tem-
porarily, it would seem that the pinnacle of disruption has been reached. With the grow-
ing awareness of parent-child conflicts in the institutionalization setting, the family har-
mony rationale is as questionable as it is in the tort area. See J.L. v. Parham, 412 F.
Supp. at 134-35; Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. at 1050; Volunteering Children, supra
note 49, at 851.
65. 442 U.S. at 606-08. The majority in Parham accepted the argument that since the
state is providing treatment at great expense, the state should not be required to burden
itself further with "procedural minuets" which would take doctors away from their
hospital duties. Id. at 606. This does not explain why juveniles are accorded no hearing
when hearings are deemed constitutionally required in involuntary commitment proceed-
ings against adults where the doctors' time is of secondary importance to the "procedural
minuets" comprising what is there called due process of law. See notes 49, 50 & 62 and ac-
companying text supra. Citing the article by Albers, Pasewark, and Meyer, the Parham
Court said that the protections afforded by an adversary proceeding are illusory. 442 U.S.
at 609. The article, however, is an indictment of the judiciary for abdicating their respon-
sibility to act as a check on psychiatric judgment. Doctrine of Immaculate Perception
supra note 61, at 31-33.
Nor is the state's expense argument a valid reason to continue the confinement of
those who do not need it. The district court in J.L. v. Parham discussed a Georgia Study
Commission report which revealed that essential alternative forms of treatment such as
specialized foster care or group homes could be provided at less expense to the state. 412
F. Supp. at 124-25 n.18, 126. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604-06, 620-21. Thus the implementa-
tion of greater procedural protections for juveniles would benefit the state's financial in-
terests while providing necessary treatment in an environment more suitable to the indi-
vidual child's needs.
66. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 606-07; Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. at 644-45.
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History shows, however, that medical personnel are often reluctant to
ask parents difficult, probing questions even when the child's safety is
threatened.7
If psychiatric opinion in adult commitments must be tested through
an adversarial hearing to comply with due process requirements, 8 and
if, as the Court maintains, children and adults have a common liberty
interest, 9 juvenile commitments based upon mere psychiatric opinion
should have been viewed as violating the due process rights of
juveniles under the fourteenth amendment.
On remand, the district court is to consider the constitutionality of
Pennsylvania's post-commitment procedures."0 If the district court im-
plements stringent post-commitment guidelines, as it has done twice
previously,7 the severe deprivation of liberty worked upon children by
the Court's decision in Institutionalized Juveniles can be attenuated.
Because the parents' decision to commit is not adequately checked
prior to commitment, the only procedure remaining which would pro-
vide a realistic second look at the commitment decision is that of an
adversarial hearing immediately after commitment.7"
Ramona M. Arena
67. See, e.g., Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Suspected Child
Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 464-65 (1978). See also Dickens, Legal Responses
to Child Abuse, 12 FAM. L.Q. 1, 15-16 (1978) (doctors hesitate to report cases of child
abuse because they are reluctant to become involved in legal proceedings and fear con-
frontations with irate parents who have been reported).
68. See notes 50 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
69. Parham, 422 U.S. at 600. See also note 16 and accompanying text supra.
70. 442 U.S. at 650 & n.9. The Supreme Court would not consider the issue of post-
commitment hearings because the district court "had no reason to consider the issue." Id.
However, the plaintiffs had raised the issue in their complaint. See Bartley v. Kremens,
402 F. Supp. at 1042.
71. See notes 1 & 11 supra.
72. As Pennsylvania law now stands, mentally ill juveniles are subject to unneces-
sary institutionalization. The regulatory scheme requires institutionalization, even if not
medically necessary, when there are no available alternatives to institutionalization. Com-
pare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7107 (Purdon Supp. 1979) (mandates treatment under the
least restrictive alternative appropriate to the individual's needs) with 8 Pa. Bull. 2433,
2436 (1978) (§§ 7100.101.3, 7100.107(d)) (qualifies § 7107 by requiring only that treatment
available and appropriate be provided).
The Supreme Court in its decision in Institutionalized Juveniles has excepted
juveniles from the general rule that institutionalization is constitutionally forbidden when
the basis for confinement no longer exists or when the only finding is that the person,
although mentally ill, is not dangerous to anyone and is capable of living safely in
freedom. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). Therefore, Pennsylvania's
mental health statutory scheme contravenes the logic of O'Connor to the extent that
juveniles who are merely mentally ill but not dangerous can be confined. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Even under the dictates of O'Connor many men-
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tally retarded people are also unnecessarily and unconstitutionally deprived of liberty
because most can live in society with a*moderate amount of supervision and be gainfully
employed. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
